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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2462 
 ___________ 
 
 CHRIS WASHINGTON-EL, 




DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; JOHN MURRAY; A.S. WILLIAMSON;  
GARY OLINGER; MICHAEL LORENZO; THOMAS DOHMAN,  
Sued in their individual and official capacities 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-04517) 
 District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, JORDAN AND GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 








 Chris Washington-El appeals pro se from an order, certified for immediate appeal, 
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entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all but one of his claims.  We 
will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Washington-El, a Pennsylvania state prisoner housed at all relevant times at SCI-
Graterford, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various prison personnel.  He asserts 
that defendants:  (1) violated his First Amendment right to exercise his religion by 
depriving him of a Koran and preventing him from participating in Ramadan (the “Free 
Exercise” claim); (2) violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts by 
placing him in administrative custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) in 
retaliation for filing a grievance and successfully contesting a misconduct charge; (3) 
violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts by obstructing his attempts to 
litigate in various respects; (4) violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
procedural due process in transferring him to the RHU; and (5) violated his Eight 
Amendment rights by depriving him of a clean jumpsuit for four months and forcing him 
to shower in an area contaminated by feces.  As defendants, he named his prison 
Superintendent (DiGuglielmo), a Deputy Superintendent (Lorenzo), three members of the 
Program Review Committee who reviewed his placement in the RHU (Murray, 
Williamson and Olinger), and the prison Security Captain who ordered it (Dohman). 
 Washington-El filed suit pro se but was later represented at all relevant stages by 
counsel.  After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits of 
his claims.  The District Court denied their motion on May 7, 2008, in a one-sentence 
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order stating merely that “there are numerous genuine issues of material fact underlying 
the plaintiff‟s claims in this case.”  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 35.)  Defendants then filed a 
second motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity, which they had not 
previously argued, and Washington-El opposed it.  Neither side supplemented the record.  
This time, by order entered August 1, 2008, the District Court granted defendants‟ motion 
as to all but Washington-El‟s Free Exercise claim.  In doing so, the District Court held 
only that Washington-El had not adduced sufficient evidence of an underlying 
constitutional violation, and it did not reach the issue of whether his asserted rights were 
“clearly established.”  Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, 
the practical effect of the District Court‟s ruling was to reconsider its initial denial of 
summary judgment on the merits. 
 The District Court then referred the parties to a Magistrate Judge to explore 
settlement.  At a mediation conference, the parties reached an agreement purportedly 
allowing Washington-El to withdraw his remaining Free Exercise claim without 
prejudice, immediately appeal the entry of summary judgment on his other claims, and 
then reassert his Free Exercise claim after this Court‟s decision on appeal.  Washington-
El filed a motion to withdraw his Free Exercise claim without prejudice pursuant to the 
agreement, which the District Court granted.  He then filed a notice of appeal from the 
District Court‟s August 1, 2008 entry of summary judgment.  (C.A. No. 08-4329.)  We 
dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the District Court had not certified 
its judgment for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure.  See Washington-El v. DiGuglielmo, 365 F. App‟x 338, 340-41 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Shortly thereafter, the District Court entered an order amending its August 1 
judgment to certify it for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b).  Washington-El now 




A.     Law of the Case 
 As a threshold matter, Washington-El argues that it was improper for the District 
Court to grant summary judgment on claims that it previously held involved issues of 
material fact.  The District Court denied defendants‟ first motion for summary judgment 
on the merits because it found “numerous genuine issues of material fact underlying the 
plaintiff‟s claims[.]”  Three months later, however, and on the same record, it effectively 
reversed course and entered summary judgment on the merits of those same claims.  It 
did not acknowledge that this was the practical effect of its ruling or explain its reasons 
                                                 
1
  The parties do not challenge the certification, but we consider it sua sponte 
because we would lack jurisdiction if the certification were improper.  See Gerardi v. 
Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368 (3d Cir. 1994).  We review the certification of an otherwise-
final order under Rule 54(b) for abuse of discretion.  See Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. 
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2006).  In this case, the District Court weighed the 
relevant factors and we cannot say that it abused its discretion in doing so.  As the 
District Court noted, Washington-El intends to appeal the summary judgment order 
regardless of the outcome of his Free Exercise claim.  We agree that permitting him to do 
so now will not result in duplication of effort on appeal, and we also believe it 
administratively beneficial at this point to fix the scope of further proceedings in the 
District Court.  Thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the entry of summary judgment, which is proper only if “there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Carter v. 
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for reaching a different conclusion. 
We are indeed troubled by these circumstances.  Under the law of the case 
doctrine, district courts are permitted to reopen previously adjudicated matters before 
final judgment so long as they (1) explain on the record their reasons for doing so and (2) 
take appropriate steps to avoid prejudicial reliance on the previous ruling.  See Williams 
v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Krueger Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Dist. 
Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing previous denial of 
summary judgment); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same).  In this case, the District Court offered no explanation for effectively 
reconsidering its prior ruling, and its failure to do so is particularly troubling in light of 
the fact that it issued both rulings on the basis of an identical record.  Cf. Krueger 
Assocs., 247 F.3d at 65-66 (entry of summary judgment after previous denial appropriate 
after additional discovery).   
Nevertheless, any error in this regard is harmless.  Washington-El was not 
prejudiced in the District Court because he responded to defendants‟ second motion and 
took no action in reliance on the prior order.  He also is not prejudiced on appeal because 
our review is plenary.  Thus, although we are troubled by the District Court‟s 
unexplained departure from its previous ruling, that departure was harmless in this case. 
B.     The Merits 
 Turning to the merits, we agree that summary judgment was appropriate as to 
                                                                                                                                                             
McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157 n.2 (2002). 
6 
 
Washington-El‟s claims of denial of access to the courts, cruel and unusual punishment, 
and denial of due process, primarily for the reasons explained by the District Court and 
argued by defendants on appeal.
2
  We also agree that summary judgment was appropriate 
on Washington-El‟s retaliation claim as to all defendants other than Dohman because 
Washington-El produced no evidence that those defendants were personally involved or 
knowingly acquiesced in Dohman‟s alleged retaliation.  See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 
257, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).  Washington-El‟s retaliation claim against Dohman himself, 
however, must be permitted to proceed. 
 Washington-El claims that Dohman ordered his transfer to the RHU in retaliation 
                                                 
2
  Washington-El‟s claim that defendants interfered with his access to the courts 
fails because he has neither alleged nor produced evidence of an “actual injury”—i.e., 
loss of an opportunity to pursue a non-frivolous claim.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
343, 348-49 (1996).  His Eighth Amendment claim fails because he has not produced 
evidence either that defendants deprived him of “„the minimal civilized measures of life‟s 
necessities‟” or that they acted with “deliberate indifference” in doing so.  See Griffin v. 
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).  Finally, his due process 
claim fails because his 17-month stay in administrative custody in the RHU while at SCI-
Graterford does not constitute an “„atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life‟” sufficient to deprive him of a protected liberty interest.  
Id. at 708 (so holding with respect to 15-month stay in administrative custody in the RHU 
at SCI-Graterford) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  In that regard, 
Washington-El asserts in his brief that he continued to be held in an RHU after his 
transfer from SCI-Graterford and that he has remained in an RHU for approximately four 
and one-half years.  The only defendants in this case, however, are SCI-Graterford 
personnel, and Washington-El never amended his complaint to allege his continued 
detention after his transfer to another prison or assert claims on that basis.  Cf. Giano v. 
Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2001) (aggregating pre- and post-transfer 
confinement in suit regarding current confinement).  To the contrary, he filed a separate 
lawsuit regarding his post-transfer confinement, and that suit remains pending as of the 
date of this opinion.  (Washington-El v. Beard, W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 08-cv-01688.)  
Washington-El‟s challenge to his continued, post-transfer detention in the RHU is most 
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for his filing of a grievance and defeat of a disciplinary charge that Dohman filed against 
him.  The relevant undisputed facts are as follows.  Dohman ordered a search of 
Washington-El‟s cell on May 8, 2005, during which officers confiscated three telephone 
books that Washington-El claims contained information regarding witnesses in his 
criminal case.  On November 25, 2005, he filed a grievance seeking the return of those 
materials, and the grievance ultimately was sustained and the materials returned to him 
(albeit some seven months later).  Shortly before that, on October 3, 2005, Washington-
El successfully contested a misconduct charge that Dohman had filed against him for 
allegedly being present in an unauthorized area.  Then, on February 20, 2006, Dohman 
ordered Washington-El‟s placement in administrative custody in the RHU, purportedly 
on the basis of information that he “may have been responsible” for an altercation 
between two other inmates.  Washington-El claims that Dohman really ordered his 
transfer to the RHU in retaliation for defending against the misconduct charge and filing 
the grievance. 
 In order to prevail on this claim, Washington-El ultimately must prove that:  (1) he 
engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) he suffered “adverse action” as a result; 
and (3) his protected activity was a “„substantial or motivating factor‟” for the adverse 
action—i.e., causation.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted).  If Washington-El makes that showing, the burden shifts to Dohman to prove 
that he “would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriately addressed in that suit and in any appeal therefrom. 
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reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 334. 
 
 In this case, there is no dispute that the first two elements are satisfied:  defendants 
concede that Washington-El‟s activity was constitutionally protected and that his transfer 
to the RHU was sufficiently adverse.  The only element at issue is causation.  The District 
Court concluded that Washington-El failed to make a sufficient showing on this element 
because Washington-El‟s “evidence, consisting of his own account of Dohman‟s 
displeasure and of affidavits of fellow prisoners, is weak and we are not persuaded that he 
has satisfied the elements necessary to sustain a retaliation claim.”  (Dist Ct. Docket No. 
43 at 10.)  The strength of Washington-El‟s evidence, however, is not the proper focus, 
and whether he has proven his claim is not the test.  “The judge‟s function at the 
summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Carter, 292 F.3d at 
157 n.2.  Although the issue is a close one, we agree with Washington-El that his 
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to find in his favor. 
 Dohman asserts that he placed Washington-El in the RHU for a single reason:  “In 
February of 2006, I received information that . . . Washington-El may have been 
responsible for an altercation between two inmates in the Institution.  Based upon this 
information, I placed Washington-El in the [RHU] in Administrative Custody pending an 
investigation.”  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 25-1 at 26-27 ¶¶ 4-5.)  Defendants‟ interrogatory 
responses confirm that this was the only stated reason.  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 33-1 at 14 ¶ 
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3) (“Plaintiff was placed in Administrative Custody due to Dohman having information 
that Washington-El was involved in injuries to another inmate in the institution[.]”).  
Defendants have provided no further detail regarding this “information,” such as its 
nature, its source, or the reliability thereof.  Washington-El has adduced evidence which, 
viewed in the light most favorable to him, both calls Dohman‟s stated reason into 
question and suggests that the actual reason may have been retaliation. 
 Washington-El has submitted affidavits from the two inmates involved in the 
altercation, Gary Dorsey and Jose Sanchez.  Dorsey states that Dohman interviewed him 
five days before ordering Washington-El to the RHU.  According to Dorsey, Dohman 
asked him whether Washington-El had been involved in the altercation, and Dorsey 
responded that he had not.  (Dist. Ct. Docket. No. 33-1 at 10 ¶¶ 1-2.)  The day after 
Dohman placed Washington-El in the RHU, he interviewed Sanchez, and Sanchez too 
told him that Washington-El had not been involved.  (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 1-4.)  Though Dohman 
claims he ordered Washington-El‟s transfer to the RHU pending an investigation into this 
altercation, he did not similarly transfer Dorsey and Sanchez, the inmates actually 
involved in it.  (Id. at 3 ¶ 12.)  This differential treatment supports an inference of 
causation.  See Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 421 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Washington-El remained in the RHU for the duration of his confinement at SCI-
Graterford.  During that time, Dohman gave at least two other reasons for keeping him in 
the RHU—that he received “information” that Washington-El was planning an escape 
and that he kept Washington-El in the RHU “to prevent him from trafficking of drugs 
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within the Institution.”  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 25-1 at 27 ¶¶ 6-7.)  These shifting 
rationales for holding Washington-El in the RHU also support an inference of causation.  
See Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280-21 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 Finally, Washington-El also has adduced evidence bearing on Dohman‟s actual 
motivation for the transfer.  According to Washington-El‟s affidavit, Dohman searched 
his cell in December 2005 and “expressed dissatisfaction” with the dismissal of the 
disciplinary charge and Washington-El‟s grievance.  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 33-1 at 2 ¶ 
10.)  Then, on the day that Dohman transferred him to administrative custody, Dohman 
questioned him about the altercation between Dorsey and Sanchez and “reiterated his 
dissatisfaction of plaintiff having been found not guilty of misconduct and grievance 
complaint filed.”  (Id. at 2 ¶ 11.)  The next day, Dohman interviewed Sanchez.  When 
Sanchez told him that Washington-El had not been involved, Dohman “became irate, and 
persistent” and “expressed his disgust and dismay for . . . Mr. Washington‟s involvement 
of filing grievances and a lawsuit.  And expressed his vengeance toward both Mr. 
Washington and myself.”  (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 4-6.)  Finally, an inmate named Rasheed Williams, 
whose affidavit Washington-El has submitted, states that Dohman “asked me about a 
grievance complaint I had filed against his office and then tried to intimidate[.]  He asked 
did I want to be in the hole for a long time like Washington for filing grievances he could 
arrange it.”  (Id. at 6.)  Taken together, Washington-El‟s evidence permits the reasonable 
inference that his constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating 
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factor” for Dohman‟s decision to order his transfer to the RHU on February 20, 2006, and 
to hold him there for at least some period of time thereafter.  Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. 
 
 Defendants raise two principal arguments to the contrary, but neither is persuasive.  
First, they argue that the temporal proximity of Washington-El‟s protected activity and 
his transfer to the RHU does not suggest retaliation because Dohman did not order 
Washington-El‟s transfer until four months after he defeated the misconduct charge, three 
months after he filed his grievance, and two months after Dohman first “expressed 
dissatisfaction” with those developments.  See Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 
108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003); Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  “„It is important to emphasize,” 
however, “that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of 
plaintiff‟s prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis 
from which an inference can be drawn.‟”  Marra, 497 F.3d at 302 (citation omitted).  
Thus, even in the absence of an unusually suggestive temporal proximity, a plaintiff can 
show “that from the „evidence gleaned from the record as a whole‟ the trier of fact should 
infer causation.”  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281).  As explained above, the record taken as a 
whole permits that inference in this case. 
 Second, defendants argue that, even if Washington-El had met his initial burden to 
show causation, the record shows that Dohman would have ordered his transfer to the 
RHU anyway for legitimate penological reasons.  They base this argument primarily on 
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an investigation begun in December 2005 into allegations that Washington-El was 
conspiring with two SCI-Graterford staff members to smuggle marijuana and other 
contraband into the prison.  During that investigation, Dohman received information that 
these staff members might also be conspiring to help Washington-El escape from prison.  
The investigation ultimately resulted in a federal criminal action against the staff 
members, who pleaded guilty to various related crimes.  Washington-El himself does not 
appear to have been charged.  Defendants argue that, even if Washington-El was only 
“tangentially” involved with the suspect staff members, it was “essential” to hold him in 
the RHU to prevent him from interacting with those staff members and to prevent his 
escape from prison.  (Defs.‟ Br. at 37.) 
 We are mindful of the deference we owe to prison officials in such matters, see 
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334, and we have no doubt that these circumstances would more than 
justify Washington-El‟s placement in the RHU.  Dohman himself, however, does not 
claim that these circumstances are what led him to order that placement.  Instead, 
Dohman claims that he did so only because he suspected that Washington-El was 
involved in the altercation between two inmates, and he claims that his separate 
investigation into the staff members became a reason for keeping him in the RHU only at 
some point thereafter.  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 25-1 at 26-27 ¶¶ 4-7.)
3
  It may be that this 
                                                 
3
  In his affidavit, Dohman states that he received information in December 2005 
that Washington-El was involved with staff members in smuggling marijuana, but “was 
asked to leave [him] in the general population” in order to build a case.  (Dist. Ct. Docket 
No. 25-1 at 26 ¶ 3.)  He does not claim that anything about this investigation had changed 
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investigation became a legitimate penological reason for holding Washington-El in the 
RHU at some point in time, but, on the existing record, it does not explain Dohman‟s 
decision to transfer him there in the first place.  Thus, the record does not permit 
summary judgment in favor of Dohman on this issue. 
 One final matter warrants discussion.  Washington-El seeks both damages and an 
injunction requiring his immediate release from the RHU.  Although Washington-El 
contends that he remains in an RHU, he is now in a different facility following his 
transfer from SCI-Graterford, and the only defendants in this action are SCI-Graterford 
personnel.  Thus, although the parties have not raised this issue, it appears that his claim 
for injunctive relief in this action may be moot.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 
248 (3d Cir. 2003).  The District Court should address that issue as appropriate on 
remand. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment as to all claims but the 
retaliation claim and remand for further proceedings.  In doing so, we hold merely that 
Washington-El has adduced sufficient evidence of retaliation to proceed to trial, and we 
express no opinion on whether he might ultimately prevail.    
                                                                                                                                                             
when he decided to place Washington-El in the RHU on February 20, 2006, and asserts 
instead that he decided to do so only to investigate the altercation between two other 
inmates.  (Id. at 26-27 ¶¶ 4-5.)  Curiously, defendants do not defend Dohman‟s actual 
rationale in their brief. 
